University of Dayton

eCommons
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Department of Philosophy

2016

Ecological Laws and Their Promise of Explanations
Viorel Pâslaru
University of Dayton, vpaslaru1@udayton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub
Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons
eCommons Citation
Pâslaru, Viorel, "Ecological Laws and Their Promise of Explanations" (2016). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 20.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub/20

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

Accepted with revisions by Philosophy & Theory in Biology. Please do not cite or
circulate. Comments are appreciated.
Ecological Laws and Their Promise of Explanations
Viorel Pâslaru
Department of Philosophy, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469-1546
vpaslaru1@udayton.edu

Marcel Weber (1999) argued that the principle of competitive exclusion is a law of
ecology that could explain phenomena (1) by direct application, or (2) by describing
default states. Since he did not offer an account of explanation by direct application of
laws, I offer an interpretation of explanation by direct application of laws based on a
proposal by Elgin and Sober (2002). I show that in both cases it is the descriptions of
mechanisms that explain phenomena, and not the laws. Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan
(2004) argued Malthus’ Law of Exponential Growth is the first law of ecology, and that
its role explanations is to describe default states. I argue the role of the descriptor of
default states is not necessary for ecological explanations, and the descriptions of
underlying mechanisms offer the required explanations. Additionally, I examine the
possibility not considered by Ginzburg and Colyvan that Malthus’ law could explain the
phenomena of exponential growth by direct application. I also show that this explanation
is inferior to the descriptions of underlying mechanisms.

Keywords: ecology, explanation, laws, mechanisms, models.
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Ecological Laws and Their Promise of Explanations
1. Introduction
In contrast to the student of physics, the student of ecology is not taught her/his
science offers an unequivocal set of laws that should be used to explain and predict
ecological phenomena. Moreover, important voices in the philosophy of biology argue
that explanation in biology is not about applying laws, but about discovering mechanisms
(Darden 2006; Bechtel 2006) and causal relations (Darden 2006, Bechtel 2006,
Woodward 2003, Woodward 2010). Yet several ecologists and philosophers of science
have argued that ecology has laws (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003b, Ginzburg and Colyvan
2004, Weber 1999, Turchin 2001, Berryman 2003, Mikkelson 2003, Lange 2005, West
and Brown 2004, Cooper 2003), and some have even argued that it is analogous to
physics (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2010).
Proponents of the laws of ecology offer converging arguments that converge on
denying an understanding of the laws of ecology modeled after the laws of physics.
Gregory Cooper (2003) shows the traditional concept of law prevents us from
acknowledging the laws of ecology, and we need to replace it with one that accounts for
the explanatory and predictive practice of ecology. Such a concept should acknowledge
that lawfulness is a matter of degree and of invariance over a range of possibilities
(Cooper 2003, 113-114). Mark Lange (2005) argues that ecological laws are invariant
over a range of changes in the microphysical states that realize them. This makes
ecological laws autonomous from microphysical states and prevents ecological
explanations from being reduced to explanations of physics. To recognize the laws of
ecology, we need to clear up some misconceptions about the laws of physics: they are not
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exceptionless, do not make precise predictions, and cannot be mere regularities, say Mark
Colyvan and Lev Ginzburg (2003b). Marcel Weber argues if it is acknowledged that
“laws generalize over a restricted domain of application, i.e., if they are construed as
universally valid only within that domain, and inapplicable outside of it” (Weber 1999,
72) and given that the competitive exclusion principle holds universally within its domain,
it follows that it is a law of competition theory.
Ginzburg and Colyvan were the first to support the view that Malthus’s law is a law
of ecology; Peter Turchin (2001) and Alan Berryman (2003) followed in accepting this
perspective. The law states that “the rate of change of population abundance, with respect
to time, is proportional to population abundance” (Colyvan 2008, 304), or dN/dt = rN.
The law is also expressed by the exponential growth equation that is usually known as the
Malthus Law: N(t) = N0ert (Colyvan 2008). Weber (1999) argues the principle of
competitive exclusion would be another law of ecology. The principle states: “species
with insufficiently differentiated fundamental niches cannot coexist at equilibrium”
(Weber 1999, 76).
In this essay, I examine the laws of Malthus, and of competitive exclusion, and their
roles in ecological explanations. I focus on these two laws because their proponents
formulate accounts of the roles of the laws in explanations. Moreover, these proposals of
laws can be seen as representative examples since their law-like character is generally
acknowledged. The list of propositions presented as laws is longer, though,1 which
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  Ginzburg and Colyvan (2004) think that ecological allometries, which are “statistical
regularities that hold between various biological and ecological quantities” (12), are good
candidates for laws of ecology. Kleiber allometry is an early, representative example of
allometries. It shows that basal metabolic rate is proportional to a ¾ power of body
weight. Other allometries are those discovered by Fenchel, Damuth, and Calder
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further shows that the case for laws in ecology merits attention. My findings could apply
to these other proposals of ecological laws. I examine a possible way in which laws could
be seen as providing explanations, and show ecological laws have a derivative
explanatory capacity, at best, and descriptions of mechanisms offer the desired
explanations.

2. Ecological Laws Explain by Direct Application
While the goal of ecologists is to show that ecology has genuine laws is tied to their
concern to demonstrate it is a science on a par with physics, philosophers of science
examine this issue with an emphasis on the role of laws in ecological explanations.
Following a distinction by Weber (1999, 81), the laws of ecology play two explanatory
roles. First, they are part of covering-law style explanations. Second, they describe a
default state and that description is used to formulate explanations that appeal to causal
processes.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
(Ginzburgh and Colyvan 2004, 16-21). Allometries are analogous to Kepler’s laws. They
are predictive, but not explanatory. Investigation into the basis of allometries takes the
researcher to lower levels of biological and physical world (Brown et al. 2004, West,
Brown, and Enquist 1997). Lange (Lange 2000, 2005) identifies three examples of
ecological laws: Liebig’s law of the minimum, the law of constant final yield, and the 3/2
thinning law, and the area law from island biogeography. Greg Mikkelson (Mikkelson
2003) argues that ecology is primarily a law-oriented science and thinks that two law-like
generalizations that refer to structural kinds are laws of ecology. In addition to Malthus’s
law, Berryman (Berryman 1999, 2003) shows that ecology uses laws that cover intraspecific cooperation, competition, predator-prey interaction, and limiting factors acting
on a population, such as Liebig’s law of the minimum. He is one of the few that claims
that these laws are not specific to ecology, but are reformulations of principles from
general systems theory. Ecology is an integrative science that borrows from complex
integrative systems, physics and chemistry (Berryman 2003, 700). Turchin (2001) adds
the law of self-limiting growth of populations and consumer-resource oscillations (20-22).	
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2.1. An Interpretation of Explanation by Direct Application of Laws and Resulting
Issues
Weber was probably the first to argue that ecological laws function in covering-law
explanations. Similar arguments were offered by Lange (2000) and Mikkelson (2003);
therefore, my findings also might apply to their proposals. Weber contends the principle
of competitive exclusion explains by direct application to a situation where competitive
exclusion obtains regularly, i.e., when a species always drives another species to
extinction. He illustrates such a case with the experimental work of G. F. Gause on
paramecia, which showed that (1) P. aurelia always drove P. caudatum to extinction,
while (2) P. caudatum and P. bursaria coexisted. The law easily explains regularity (1)
that is an instance of the principle, but not regularity (2) which is not an instance.
Weber’s description of the explanatory role of the principle applied to the first regularity
is limited to the following: “The explanation given is simply a direct application of the
principle itself. The most straightforward analysis for such cases, I suggest, is to say that
the principle functions as a law-like generalization which tells us that, under the given
conditions, one of the two-species communities had to be unstable (by causal necessity)”
(Weber 1999, 81). I interpret this brief description as a proposal to understand the role of
the principle of competitive exclusion in terms of the deductive-nomological account.
Stated in the deductive-nomological form, this principle yields the following schema:
Explanans:
Law1: The principle of competitive exclusion: species with insufficiently
differentiated fundamental niches cannot coexist at equilibrium.
Antecedent condition, i.e., description of “the given conditions”:
C1: insufficiently differentiated niches of P. aurelia and P. caudatum, which
could be further specified as the fact that they consume the same source of food,
yeast cells, in a homogeneous environment;
C2: differentiated niches of P. caudatum and P. bursaria, which feed on different
organisms and in different parts of the environment.
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Explanandum:
P. aurelia always drives P. caudatum to extinction, but P. caudatum and P.
bursaria coexist.
If the explanandum were the fact that P. aurelia always drives P. caudatum to
extinction, its explanans would consist of the same law of competitive exclusion and
antecedent condition C1, yet without antecedent condition C2.
A conception of ecological explanation formulated along the lines of Hempel’s
(1965) DN model, as implied by Weber’s perspective on the application of laws for
explanatory purposes, poses some issues. First, Weber’s proposal does not do justice to
how ecologists use models to describe and explain specific facets of the world; this
includes Gause’s account of competitive exclusion which he cites as a representative
example to formulate his perspective on the role of laws. In various sciences, including
ecology, scientists use models to formulate predictions that they hope will agree with the
data obtained from interaction with the world. Should the prediction agree with the data,
one concludes that the model most likely fits the world. The model would be rejected if
its prediction does not agree with the data. Typically, the prediction does not match the
data exactly, but it closely approximates the expected data. Of the many models that yield
predictions, scientists would choose those models whose predictions better match the data,
and the model would be best fitting.2 Secondly, Gause’s research implemented this
epistemological conception long before philosophers articulated it. In his words, “The
quantitative expression of the growth of population must go hand in hand with a direct
study of the factors which control growth. Only in those cases, where the results deduced
from equations are confirmed by the data obtained through entirely different methods, by
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2
For a more detailed account see Giere (1999, Giere, Bickle, and Mauldin 2006).
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a direct study of the factors limiting growth, can we be sure of the correctness of the
quantitative theories” (Gause 1934, 58). After having performed a number of experiments,
Gause concludes: “the process of competition under our conditions has always resulted in
one species being entirely displaced by another, in complete agreement with the
predictions of the mathematical theory” (1934, 103). The mathematical theory he refers
to are the Lotka-Volterra equations of competition, which is the model used to derive the
prediction that there is no equilibrium between competing species occupying the same
“niche” and that one of them will be displaced (Gause 1934, 48). Considering this, it is
more appropriate to understand the explanation of competitive exclusion not in terms of
the application of a law, but in terms of the fit between the model and experimentally
obtained data. This conclusion extends to other investigations of competitive exclusion in
laboratory conditions. For example, Vandermeer’s (1969) work on competition offers
another good illustration of this approach centered on models. He used models to predict
the growth of populations of four protozoans in monoculture, in two-way competition
and in four-way competition. He then compared data obtained from laboratory
experiments with what was expected based on models. In most cases, there was good fit
between prediction and data.
The second difficulty that the DN account applied to competitive exclusion faces is
that some ecological explananda present themselves as precise numeric values that do not
follow deductively from the explanans. For example, the actual size of population A is
325 individuals, and population B is 3; however, the number that follows from the
explanans is 333 individuals of A and 0 of B. The difference could be attributed to
various accidental factors, but that would make the explanation probabilistic.
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Alternatively, the explanation could be reconstructed according to the inductive-statistical
model, which would require a probabilistic law, but the principle of competitive
exclusion is causally necessary and within its restricted domain, the law has deterministic
nomic force (Weber 1999, 80). These types of results are found in the work of
Vandermeer, who continued Gause’s laboratory experiments and used his equations of
competition to make precise predictions about the trajectory of population growth. The
prediction for P. bursaria is that it will be eliminated, yet the observed data showed that
it continues, although at a lower density. Vandermeer did not reject the model used to
make the prediction because the general trend of the data agreed with predictions from
the model. He cited “unknown but insignificant frictional components or excessive
inherent variability” responsible for the mismatch between observed data and prediction
(Vandermeer 1969, 367). Since the outcome of these examples–the general trend–very
closely approaches competitive exclusion, one would expect the principle of competitive
exclusion to explain it by direct application as illustrated above. However, explanation by
direct application presents the second difficulty.
2.2 An Alternative Proposal of Explanation by Direct Application of Ecological Laws
To address the aforementioned difficulties and to account for the explanatory role of
laws of ecology, I adopt a proposal by Elgin and Sober (2002) on explanation that
Bokulich (2011) calls covering-law model explanation. Elgin and Sober argue that the
explanans explains the explanandum “not by entailing it or by conferring a probability on
it (high or low), but by showing that the value described in the explanandum is close to
the value predicted by the idealization” (Elgin and Sober 2002, 448). The explanans must
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contain (a) descriptions of the initial conditions, and (b) an idealized model.3 They use
optimality models to illustrate their proposal:
(i) Idealized law entailed by the optimality model: “If organisms are fitter the
closer they are to the optimal value α and if no forces other than selection are at
work in the population, then the population will evolve to a state in which all
organisms exhibit the trait value α.”
(ii) Partial description of initial conditions: “Organisms are fitter the closer they
are to the optimal value α.”
(iii) Observed facts: “The n organisms in the population have trait values β1, β2,
…, βn (where each βi differs only negligibly from α).” (Elgin and Sober 2002,
447)
Propositions (i) and (ii) explain (iii) in the sense that they show that the value
described in (iii) is close to that predicted by (i) and (ii). Propositions (i) and (ii) do not
make up a complete explanation, since they do not describe all causally relevant factors;
nontheless, they are explanatory (Elgin and Sober 2002, 447). There is more to this
explanatory relationship when it is examined from the viewpoint of the model
explanations account attributed to Bokulich (2011). The model plays a central role in this
account, and its explanatory role is grounded in its ability to represent the pattern of
counterfactual dependence specific to the target system. Given this counterfactual
isomorphism, the model─together with the description of the antecedent conditions, and
the resulting prediction─can provide information about how the investigated system
would behave if the elements of the model were changed in various ways (Bokulich 2011,
39). Bokulich cites only the model as a provider of explanatory information, but I include

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3
Elgin and Sober require that the idealized model entail a conditional that is an idealized
law whose antecedent does not apply to any real world system. This requirement follows
from their use of optimality models that assume infinitely large populations. Since
ecological models assume finite populations, I would relax this requirement. Ecological
models entail antecedents that apply to real world system.
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the description of antecedent conditions and the prediction because the model must be
interpreted to link it to the examined system, and both interpret the model.
When applied to the case of competitive exclusion described by Gause and examined
by Weber, the covering-law model account yields the following reconstruction of
ecological explanations that use laws, or law-like generalizations and models that express
them:
(i) Law1 entailed by the Lotka-Volterra equations of competition: If the species
have insufficiently differentiated fundamental species, then they cannot coexist at
equilibrium.
(ii) C1: P. aurelia and P. caudatum occupy the same niche; they consume the
same source of food, yeast cells, in a homogeneous environment;
C2: differentiated niches of P. caudatum and P. bursaria, which feed on different
organisms and in different parts of the environment.
(iii) Prediction based on (i) and (ii): P. aurelia will eliminate P. caudatum, while
P. caudatum and P. bursaria will coexist.
(iv) Data obtained from experiments: P. aurelia always drives P. caudatum to
extinction, but P. caudatum and P. bursaria coexist.
Propositions (i) through (iii) provide information about how the target system would
behave given changes in the model and in the initial conditions. In light of this, (i) and
(ii) explain (iv) by showing that (iv) agrees with prediction (iii) derived from (i) and (ii).
Elgin and Sober’s proposal might work for evolutionary theory, but one might still
object that its application to competitive exclusion does not convincingly produce a
covering law explanation. The problem is with proposition (i). Recall that Bokulich
claims models involved in covering-law model explanations express laws, and they also
represent counterfactual dependencies specific to the target system. I continue this line of
reasoning and maintain that the reason counterfactual dependencies are able to
characterize the target system is because it is a mechanism. Stuart Glennan (2002) offers
this definition of mechanisms that supports my claim:
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(M) A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior
by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can
be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. (Glennan
2002, S344)
The direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations characterize counterfactual
dependencies between the parts of the mechanism and the model of the mechanism, or
the system represents these dependencies. Regarding the laws, I do not characterize them
as exceptionless regularities of unrestricted scope, but only regularities of restricted scope.
This characterization of laws is more appropriate for the principle of competitive
exclusion since it has exceptions, as Keddy (2001) has shown. Regularities themselves
are regular behaviors produced by mechanisms. Stated differently, the consistent
operation of a mechanism produces a regularity that is described as a law. By virtue of
representing the counterfactual dependencies between the parts of the mechanism and its
behavior, a model also expresses a law. This entails that the law of competitive exclusion
stated in proposition (i) has a derivative explanatory role derived from the mechanism
that produces competitive exclusion. To explain why P. aurelia always drives P.
caudatum to extinction, but P. caudatum and P. bursaria coexist, we need to describe the
underlying mechanism. The principle of competitive exclusion simply states that a
regularity occurs, but it does not tell us why it happens. In Glennan’s terms, the principle
of competitive exclusion is a mechanically explicable law. Shifting the explanatory role
from the laws of restricted scope to the underlying mechanisms is also consistent with
Gause’s approach, and with later ecologists. Gause sought to identify the specific
conditions that prevent the coexistence of P. aurelia and P. caudatum, but favor cooccurrence of P. caudatum and P. bursaria. These conditions of differential feeding
behavior are key components of the mechanism of competitive exclusion. Since the
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conditions occur regularly, competitive exclusion happens on a regular basis as well, and
the principle states that.
2.3 Malthus’ Law in Covering-Law Model Explanations
According to Ginzburg and Colyvan, Malthus’ Law describes a default state from
which actual ecological conditions depart, and ecological mechanisms explain this
departure. I examine this role in Section 3.1. Supporters of the laws of ecology could
argue that the Law of Exponential Growth explains by direct application to those cases
that exhibit exponential growth, even if Ginzburg and Colyvan do not ascribe this
explanatory role to Malthus’ Law. In Section 2.3, I examine this possibility.
Presumably because “populations do not grow exponentially for long (if at all)”
(Colyvan 2011, 304), Colyvan and Ginzburg do not explore those cases where Malthus’s
Law does not just describe a default state that does not occur, but plays a more
comprehensive role in explanations of exponential growth in natural populations. Such
growth happens in invasive species (Rockwood 2006) or in those cases where predation
and interspecific competition are absent (Gotelli 2008). To help illustrate the argument, I
use an example of exponential growth in the wild based on Gotelli (2008), but with slight
modifications.
In 1937, time t0, eight pheasants were introduced onto Protection island, close to the
coast of the Washington State, that had abundant food resources and lacked predators.
Distance between the island and the coast precluded migration. By 1938, t2, the
population increased to 30 birds, and to 1989 by 1942, although the exponential growth
model predicted 5933 birds. The population grew exponentially the first three years.
Ecologists’ explanation of the growth of this population fits the covering model account.

Laws	
  of	
  Ecology	
  and	
  Explanations	
  

13	
  

From the model of exponential growth, N(t) = N0ert, and given the estimated finite rate of
increase λ = Nt+1/Nt = (30/8)=3.75, and the rate of increase r as ln(3.75)=1.3217, one
deduces a prediction of the population size at the time of interest, say, 1940, to be 421.
The actual population size is 418.
The model and the initial conditions explain the observed data by showing that the
derived prediction matches actual data, and how the observed data could have changed if
the rate of increase or the initial population size been different. Ecologists do not try to
deduce the actual size of the population from Malthus’ Law and a description of the
antecedent condition, which make up the explanans. Strictly speaking, the value 418 does
not follow deductively from the explanans. For this value to follow deductively, one
would have to revise the explanans and add an extra premise specifying the deterministic
cause of the death of the three birds. This move would be inconsistent with the actual
practice of ecologists, who are content with getting a close fit of the model prediction
with the data. Moreover, the causes of the death of three birds that account for the
mismatch between prediction and the actual data would be probabilistic, similar to the
previously examined case of competition, which would require reconstructing the
explanation according to the inductive-statistical model. This approach requires a
probabilistic law, however, this is not the case with Malthus’ Law.
Population growth after 1940 significantly diverges from the model predictions. To
explain the population size after 1940, the exponential model needs to incorporate the
depletion of the food resource, which would make it logistic. As before, this would
assume the initial conditions of no predation, no inter-specific competition, and no
environmental disturbances. The logistic model would be explanatory as described above.
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In reality, by 1943, there were no pheasants on the island. Their population size abruptly
decreased to zero because the U.S. Army set up camp on the island and the soldiers ate
the birds.
One could formulate to this interpretation of the explanatory role of Malthus’ law the
same objection that was raised to the explanatory role of the principle of competitive
exclusion. The Law of Exponential Growth and the associated model only describe a
tendency of a population to grow under certain conditions. The explanatory force of the
law and of its model derives from the mechanism that produces the regular behavior of
exponential growth. The mechanism consists of groups of birds of different genders that
reproduce and die at certain rates and certain ages, the abundance of resources, the lack
of migration, and the absence of competitors and predators─wolves, foxes, or homesick
soldiers. It is the regular interaction between birds of different genders, the absence of
migration, of interaction with competitors and predators that produces the exponential
growth. An ecological explanation would specify all them. However, the model is
incomplete. It contains only population abundance, time, and population growth rate, but
not the other ecologically relevant factors. That the mechanism has explanatory priority is
shown by the fact that one can explain exponential growth by referencing its parts and
how they interact without using the model. But one cannot explain the exponential
growth with the mathematical model and without linking it to the mechanism. The
mechanism is sufficient to explain exponential growth, but the model is not. The model
affords good predictions, but provides incomplete explanations.
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3. Ecological Laws as Descriptors of Default States
Discussions of laws of ecology rely on an analogy with Newton’s first law: In the
absence of forces acting on an object, the acceleration of the object is zero (Serway and
Jewett 2008). The analogy serves two purposes: 1) to argue that ecology has laws
(Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003), and 2) to describe the role of these laws in explanations
(Weber 1999, Colyvan and Ginzburg 2004). Following this analogy, Colyvan and
Ginzburg, and Weber identify different laws of ecology, yet they see them as playing the
same role as descriptors of a default state. This is the second role that laws of ecology
play in explanations.
3.1 Ginzburg and Colyvan on Laws as Descriptors of Default States
Ginzburg was the first to argue that Malthus’ Law is analogous to Newton’s first law.
The Malthusian Law is the only formula in population dynamics for which he accepts
applying the term “law”; all the other formulas are models (Ginzburg 1986). Ginzburg
developed this argument in a series of articles and in a book co-authored with Colyvan
(Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003b, a, Colyvan and Ginzburg 2010, Ginzburg and Colyvan
2004). They propose a research program for ecology modeled after Newtonian principles.
Just like Newton’s first law, Malthus’ Law describes a default state of a growing
population when no disturbing forces are present. Analogously to the second law of
classical physics that defines the concept of force as a quantity resulting in acceleration,
Ginzburg and Colyvan “define ‘ecological forces’ as quantities that act on growing (or
declining) populations as second-order quantities – ‘ecological accelerations’” (Ginzburg
and Colyvan 2004, 101). Considered together, the two laws of physics initiate a research
program aimed at identifying the forces that exist in nature. Analogously, Malthus’ Law
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and the definition of ecological forces open up a research program to identify ecological
forces that affect the dynamics of populations. Ginzburg and Colyvan examine three such
ecological forces: energetics (the balance of metabolism and consumption), the maternal
effect (the effect of the endowment of mothers on their daughters), and predator-prey
interactions, the research program being open to other ecological forces.
Before further examining Ginzburg’s and Colyvan’s proposal, we need to clarify
certain terms. They use the term “ecological force” as part of the analogy to physics.
Throughout their work, they also use the terms “cause” and “mechanism” instead of
“ecological force” to refer to entities that change population dynamics. I will use only the
term “mechanism.”
Populations rarely grow exponentially. More often their growth is influenced by
various ecological forces, and the resulting population dynamics is described better using
other models, such as the logistic model or the predator-prey model, which are central
components explaining these population dynamics. Maternal effect is a key mechanism
influencing the growth of a population; it causes inertia in population dynamics, as
follows: “A population growing on a constant flow of resources and growing to its
equilibrium value will not stop at that value but will overshoot the equilibrium. The
reason is that mothers reproducing when the population is below equilibrium abundance
have plentiful resources and their daughters’ reproduction responds not only to daughters’
current conditions but also to the conditions their mothers experienced. The same
happens when populations decline from a higher abundance to the equilibrium: in this
case, mothers were overabundant and thus undernourished. The resulting effect on
daughters leads to the undershooting of the equilibrium abundance. Maternal effect can
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thus easily lead to populations oscillating about the equilibrium value” (Ginzburg and
Colyvan 2004, 50). When this maternal effect is incorporated into the exponential growth
equation, it yields a model comprised of a pair of equations; the first one is a logistic
growth equation:
N t +1 = RN t f (X t )
" S %
X t +1 = X t g$
(1)
'
# N t +1 &
The maternal effect model
€ assumes non-overlapping generations. N is population

abundance, X is the average individual quality, while parameter R is the maximum
€
population growth rate of individuals of very high average quality. R is assumed to be
greater than 1. If R<1, the population will decline; t represents time in generations; f is a
monotonically increasing function of quality, X, while g is a monotonically increasing
function of per capita food, S/Nt+1 (Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004, 50-51).
Ginzburg and Colyvan do not offer an account of how the model works, but we can
understand its explanatory role based on its usage. Ginzburg and Taneyhill (1994) used
the model to predict the dynamics of six populations of different forest moth species.
They compared predictions with observed data on population cycles of those species, and
they found out that predictions of the model fit very well with the observed data. Given
this fit between predictions and observations, Ginzburg and Taneyhill concluded the
model of the maternal effect mechanism might explain the population cycles. This
finding indicates that Malthus’ law does not explain the observed dynamics of
populations. Moreover, its role in ecological explanations is questionable.
According to an influential view among ecologists, the goal of ecology is to study
“the interactions that determine the distribution and abundance of organisms,” (Krebs
2008, 5), and which are observed. The six populations of moth species serve as an
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example of the distribution and abundance that ecology studies. The maternal effect
mechanism, represented by Model (1), explains the abundance of the six populations.
Moreover, this explanation does not even cite the Malthus’ law from which the observed
population dynamics departs. The law is not sufficient for explanation since the maternal
effect mechanism is required, and it is not necessary either, since the maternal effect
mechanism explains the observed population dynamics. The requirement of Ginzburg
and Colyvan’s program to begin with the Malthus’ law and then search for mechanisms
to explain the departure from exponential growth unnecessarily complicates the matter.

3.2 Weber on Laws as Descriptors of Default States
Weber (1999) argues that the second explanatory role of the principle of competitive
exclusion is to be part of explanations of cases to which it does not apply directly. In such
explanations, the principle describes a default state, competitive exclusion, that one
would expect to occur, but it does not. The description of the default state offers a
contrast class for the explanation of the structure of a community. Hutchinson’s work on
plankton underlies this contrastive explanation. Hutchinson observed that one would
expect few species of phytoplankton because it consumes few limited resources, which
leads to competition and eliminates some species. However, there are many coexisting
species of phytoplankton in natural conditions, contrary to what would be expected based
on the principle of competitive exclusion. Faced with this situation, one could ask “Why
are there many species of planktonic algae in freshwater lakes?” However, this question
is difficult to answer because “one doesn’t really know where to start” (Weber 1999, 83).
By contrast, the question, “Why are there many species of algae, rather than just one
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species: the superior competitor?” is significantly more precise (Weber 1999, 83). The
principle of competitive exclusion produces a contrast class where all algae except one
should go extinct. Since this does not happen, the description of a causal mechanism,
which is environmental variation in the case of phytoplankton, explains coexistence by
showing how algae can evade competition. In Weber’s view, the logic of this contrastive
explanation is similar to explanations in classical mechanics that use Newton’s First Law,
which states that in the absence of forces a body will be at rest or in uniform motion in a
straight line. Considering that the body is in neither of these conditions, its motion would
be explained by citing a force that removes it from rest or from the uniform motion
(Weber 1999, 83).
Weber’s proposal encounters the same difficulties as Ginzburg’s and Colyvan’s view.
The role of the principle of competitive exclusion as a descriptor of a contrast case, or
default state is not necessary. The need to formulate explanation-seeking questions which
include a contrast case is motivated by heuristic reasons. Without the contrast case, “The
question is hard to answer; one doesn’t really know where to start” (Weber 1999).
Arguably, not all researchers would find this difficulty insurmountable. To account for
coexistence of species, they simply might look for factors that promote growth, and for
the absence of factors that inhibit it. That is, one would describe a mechanism responsible
for the coexistence of species. Even if the description of the contrast class is helpful
heuristically to formulate an explanation, the principle of the competitive exclusion is not
sufficient to answer the explanation-seeking question, since the description of a
mechanism─environmental heterogeneity─is necessary.
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4. Conclusion
The upshot of the foregoing examination is that the laws of ecology could figure in
two types of explanations. In the first type of explanation, laws explain by direct
application to the phenomenon in question, and are part of covering-law model
explanations. However, I showed that models which express ecological laws could have
some explanatory capacity derived from representing the mechanisms that produce
regularities. Describing the mechanism is sufficient to explain the phenomenon, but
citing the law is not. In the second type of explanation, the laws describe a default case
that does not occur and require a description of a mechanism to explain the deviation
from the default condition. My analysis revealed that the laws are not sufficient to
account for the explanandum phenomenon, since the description of the mechanism is
required. The laws are not necessary either because the description of the mechanism
explains the phenomenon under scrutiny. Therefore, the role of laws in ecological
explanations has been overstated.
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